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FAIR BENEFITS AND ITS CRITICS: 
WHO IS RIGHT? 
DAVID WENDLER* 
SEEMA K. SHAH* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Protecting participants from exploitation is one of the primary ethical 
challenges posed by clinical research.1 This challenge is especially pressing for 
clinical trials that are conducted in lower-income countries by sponsors and 
investigators from higher-income countries.2 For many commentators, the 
paradigmatic example of a problematic trial in this regard is one that evaluates 
in lower-income countries an intervention which will be marketed in higher-
income countries only.3 To address the potential for exploitation, it is widely 
agreed that the host communities and the individuals who participate in these 
trials should receive sufficient benefits.4 
The Fair Benefits framework describes one possible way to realize this 
goal.5 It argues that host communities and research participants should receive a 
fair level of benefits given the extent to which they contribute to the study in 
question and the extent to which they are thereby exposed to risks and burdens.6 
 
*© 2017 David Wendler, Department of Bioethics, NIH Clinical Center, Seema K. Shah, At time of 
writing: Department of Bioethics, NIH Clinical Center & Division of AIDS, National Institute of Allergy 
& Infectious Diseases. Currently at Seattle Children’s research Institute & University of Washington. 
 1. Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., What Makes Clinical Research Ethical? 283 JAMA 2701, 2701 (2000). 
 2. Marcia Angell, The Ethics of Clinical Research in the Third World, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 847, 
848 (1997) (raising concerns about the standard of care in trials conducted in lower-income countries); 
Harold Varmus & David Satcher, Ethical Complexities of Conducting Research in Developing Countries, 
337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1003, 1003 (1997) (highlighting controversies over trials on how best to prevent 
maternal-infant transmission of HIV in developing countries). 
 3. Peter Lurie & Sidney Wolfe, Unethical Trials of Interventions to Reduce Perinatal Transmission 
of Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Developing Countries, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 853, 853 (1997) 
(discussing ethical issues about clinical trials conducted in lower-income countries to test antiretroviral 
drugs that, at the time, were not expected to be readily available in those countries because of cost). 
 4. Harold T. Shapiro & Eric M. Meslin, Ethical Issues in the Design and Conduct of Clinical Trials 
in Developing Countries, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 139, 139–40 (2001) (explaining that one of the ways to 
justify conducting clinical trials in developing countries is to address important health problems facing 
those countries). 
 5. Participants in the 2001 Conference on Ethical Aspects of Research in Developing Countries, 
Fair Benefits for Research in Developing Countries, 298 SCI. 2133, 2133–34 (2002) [hereinafter 
Participants 2002]. 
 6. Id. at 2133. 
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Since it was first described in 2002, the Fair Benefits framework has been subject 
to a number of criticisms, leading some commentators to conclude that it should 
be rejected in favor of alternative approaches.7 To assess whether this conclusion 
is warranted, the present manuscript describes the eight most prominent 
criticisms and evaluates their implications for how best to address the potential 
for exploitation in multinational research.  
This analysis reveals that the prominent criticisms fall into three groups. 
First, several do not pertain to the Fair Benefits framework itself, but concern 
related issues that merit assessment in their own right.8 Second, a number of the 
most prominent criticisms are mistaken.9 Third, a few of the criticisms point to 
aspects of the Fair Benefits framework that require refinement and elaboration.10 
This third group of criticisms would support the conclusion that the Fair Benefits 
framework should be rejected if it is unlikely that the needed refinements can be 
realized, or there exists an alternative approach that does better in this regard. 
We argue that the nature of the needed refinements suggests future research will 
be able to address them. In addition, there does not exist an alternative approach 
which needs significantly fewer or even no refinements and addresses the 
potential for exploitation at least as well as the Fair Benefits framework. We 
conclude that the extant criticisms do not provide a reason to reject the Fair 
Benefits framework.11 Instead, they point to the need for further research to 
refine the framework and thereby ensure appropriate protection for those who 
participate in clinical trials in lower-income countries.12 
II. FAIR BENEFITS VERSUS REASONABLE AVAILABILITY 
Conducting research in lower-income countries in order to develop medical 
treatments and interventions for higher-income countries has the potential to 
violate two of the fundamental ethical requirements for clinical research.13 First, 
to the extent that these trials target individuals and communities in lower-income 
countries because they are poor and vulnerable, they violate the requirement for  
fair subject selection.14 Research participants and research sites should be 
selected based on scientific and ethical considerations, not based on who is less 
able to protect themselves.15 Second, participants and host communities in lower-
 
 7. Id. at 2133; see also Udo Schüklenk, Calling it a Day on Proceduralism in Bioethics? 24 
BIOETHICS ii, ii (2010). 
 8. See infra Parts III.1 & III.2. 
 9. See infra Parts III.3 & III.4. 
 10. See infra Parts III.5 to III.8. 
 11. See infra Part IV. 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. Emanuel et al., supra note 1, at 2704–06.  
 14. Id. at 2704 (explaining past abuses where vulnerable participants were selected to participate in 
research because they were relatively easy to enroll). 
 15. Id. (pointing out that fair subject selection involves making the scientific goals of the study the 
basis for selecting participants, not the vulnerability of the participants). 
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income countries contribute to and accept the risks of these trials, while all the 
benefits may go to individuals in higher-income countries.16 These trials thereby 
have the potential to violate the requirement for an appropriate distribution of the 
risks and potential benefits of clinical trials.17 Initial proposals to protect research 
participants in lower-income countries tried to identify additional requirements 
that might address these two concerns.18  
The “responsiveness” requirement mandates that clinical trials in lower-
income countries should not be designed to address the needs or priorities of 
higher-income countries, at least not exclusively.19 Instead, they should address 
the health needs or priorities of the communities in which they are conducted.20 
This requirement helps to ensure fair subject selection by ensuring that there is a 
justification for conducting a given trial in lower-income countries, namely, the 
trial addresses the health needs of the host communities.21 
The “reasonable availability” requirement was developed to address the 
potential for an inappropriate distribution of risks and potential benefits.22 This 
requirement was first emphasized in 1993 by the Council for International 
Organizations of Medical Sciences (“CIOMS”), and is described in their revised 
guidelines of 2016 as follows: 
Sponsors and researchers must “make every effort, in cooperation with 
government and other relevant stakeholders, to make available as soon as 
possible any intervention or product developed, and knowledge generated, for 
the population or community in which the research is carried out.”23 
Although the reasonable availability requirement received widespread 
support,24 it fails to ensure an appropriate risk-benefit distribution.25 Most 
importantly, many clinical trials, including early phase trials, observational 
studies, and trials testing products which prove to be ineffective, pose risks and 
 
 16. Id. at 2705. 
 17. Id. at 2704. 
 18. Alex John London, Responsiveness to Host Community Health Needs, THE OXFORD TEXTBOOK 
OF CLINICAL RESEARCH ETHICS 737, 737 (Ezekiel J. Emanuel ET AL. eds., 2008).  
 19. See id. at 738 (describing the standard view that if research is ethically sound it must respond to 
the health needs or priorities of the community hosting the research).  
 20. See id.  
 21. See id.  
 22. See id. (explaining that in order to prevent participants from participating in research and not 
realizing any of the benefits of said research, the researchers should provide health-related benefits to the 
host community).   
 23. COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF MEDICAL SCIENCES: GUIDELINES, 
https://cioms.ch/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2018) (stating that the current guidelines call for governments and 
civil societies to make any possible intervention or product developed in a community available to that 
community within a reasonable amount of time).  
 24. See Participants in the 2001 Conference on Ethical Aspects of Research in Developing Countries 
34 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 17, 17 (2004) (explaining there is general agreement that “reasonable availability” 
is imperative to preventing community exploitation)[hereinafter Participants 2004]. 
 25. Id. at 19. 
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burdens, but do not yield a successful intervention.26 And some clinical trials fail 
to recruit a sufficient number of participants or fail to yield meaningful results.27 
All of these trials fail to identify successful interventions or products and fail to 
generate knowledge which benefits the host communities. As a result, the 
reasonable availability requirement fails to ensure an appropriate risk-benefit 
ratio in these cases.28 Given that trials which do not recruit a sufficient number 
of participants or do not yield a successful intervention may well represent the 
majority of clinical trials, it follows that reliance on the reasonable availability 
requirement fails to address the potential for exploitation in lower-income 
countries.29 
With these concerns in mind, the Fair Benefits framework was developed 
as an alternative to the reasonable availability requirement.30 It is based on the 
claim that the potential for exploitation traces not to the types of benefits that 
individuals receive, but to the level of benefits they receive.31 In particular, 
conducting research in lower-income countries raises concern that the host 
communities and the participants might fail to receive a fair level of benefits.32 
The Fair Benefits framework was designed to address this concern by requiring 
that participants and host communities in lower-income countries receive a fair 
level of benefits.33 
To this end, the Fair Benefits framework endorses the responsiveness 
requirement, stipulating that clinical trials in lower-income countries should be 
responsive to their health needs.34 Then, in place of the reasonable availability 
requirement, the framework endorses three conditions.35 First, based on Alan 
Wertheimer’s account of exploitation,36 it stipulates that participants and host 
communities in lower-income countries should receive a fair level of benefits 
given the risks and burdens to which they are exposed, and the extent to which 
others benefit from their contributions to the study.37 As participants and 
communities in lower-income countries are exposed to greater risks and burdens, 
 
 26. See id. at 20–21 (stating that the reasonable availability standard does not guarantee a benefit).  
 27. See id. at 26 (noting that many trials produce findings that are not significant or negative, and fail 
to demonstrate that the intervention was effective).   
 28. Id. at 18 (explaining that the potential exploitation of research participants is possible). 
 29. See Participants 2004, supra note 24, at 18.  
 30. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Benefits to Host Countries, in THE OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL 
RESEARCH ETHICS 719, 725 (2008) (stating that the risk-benefit evaluation must be favorable in such a 
way that the potential benefits to the individual participants outweigh the risks).  
 31. See Participants 2004, supra note 24, at 19–20. 
 32. See id. at 18 (arguing that lower-income communities must derive potential benefit from the 
research they host). 
 33. See id. at 22. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See id. at 19–20 (discussing Alan Wertheimer’s theory of exploitation as applied to cases where 
one party receives an unfair level of benefits). 
 37. Id. at 22. 
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they should receive a correspondingly greater level of benefits.38 Similarly, the 
more others benefit from the contributions of individuals in lower-income 
countries, the more those individuals should benefit themselves.39  
Second, the Fair Benefits framework endorses collaborative partnership, 
mandating that the benefits to be provided to participants and host communities 
in lower-income countries should not be determined solely by individuals from 
higher-income countries.40 Instead, individuals in lower-income countries should 
be involved in determining what benefits they receive.41  
Third, the Fair Benefits framework endorses a transparency requirement.42 
This requirement was based on recognition of the fact that it can be difficult to 
determine what level of benefits is fair in a given case.43 To help to address this 
challenge, the Fair Benefits framework proposes a repository of prior trials that 
provided a fair level of benefits.44 This record, which could be maintained by a 
reliable third party, such as the WHO, would provide a kind of case law against 
which new proposals could be evaluated to help to determine whether they are 
fair.45  
The Fair Benefits framework was intended to provide a more flexible 
approach that helps to address the potential for exploitation across a broader 
range of trials compared to the reasonable availability requirement.46 However, 
critics argue that the Fair Benefits framework suffers from a number of 
fundamental shortcomings which suggest that it fails to adequately address the 
potential for exploitation of participants and host communities in lower-income 
countries.47 These critics conclude that the Fair Benefits framework should be 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. at 23 (arguing that the population being asked to enroll should be consulted about whether 
the proposed benefits are sufficient and fair). 
 41. Id. at 23. 
 42. See id. (noting that transparency allows comparisons across similar interactions). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 23–24. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Angela Ballantyne, ‘Fair Benefits’ Accounts of Exploitation Require a Normative Principle 
of Fairness: Response to Gbadegesin and Wendler, and Emanuel et al., 22 BIOETHICS 239, 240 (2008) 
(criticizing the utility of the fair benefits framework because it lacks a substantive principle of fairness, 
which she maintains is essential to the fair benefits account of exploitation); Reidar K. Lie, The Fair 
Benefits Approach Revisited, 40 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 3, 3 (2010) (arguing that the fair benefits approach 
is flawed because it is too vague, internally inconsistent, and judges individual research projects without 
taking into account that the goal of research is to develop knowledge that is most useful for society); See 
Alex John London, Justice and the Human Development Approach to International Research, 35 
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 24, 24, 26, 29 (2005) (arguing that fair benefits advocates a “minimalist” approach, 
which does not adequately consider issues of background injustice); Alex John London & Kevin J.S. 
Zollman, Research at the Auction Block: Problems for the Fair Benefits Approach to International 
Research, 40 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 34, 37, 41 (2010) (criticizing that there are no specifics about how to 
engage in a process of collaborative partnership and that the practical result of a procedural approach to 
fairness is a race to the bottom); Joseph Millum,  Sharing the Benefits of Research Fairly: Two 
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rejected in favor of some alternative approach that provides better protection.48 
To assess this conclusion, consider the eight most prominent criticisms. 
III. CRITICISMS AND ANALYSIS 
A. Fails to Consider Background Injustice 
The Fair Benefits framework is based on a transaction-specific account of 
fairness in the sense that it is designed to help to ensure a fair distribution of the 
benefits and burdens of individual trials.49 What constitutes a fair distribution in 
this regard depends on the risks and burdens to which participants and host 
communities in lower-income countries are exposed by a given trial and the 
extent to which others benefit from their contributions to the trial.50 
Some critics have pointed out that this approach ignores the fact that the 
circumstances in which individual trials are conducted in lower-income countries 
often are characterized by significant background injustice.51 Individuals in 
lower-income countries frequently are comparatively worse off, due at least in 
part to prior unjust treatment, including unjust treatment by individuals, entities 
and governments of higher-income countries.52 This history is problematic in its 
own right, and also raises concern that sponsors and investigators may benefit 
 
Approaches, 38 J. MED. ETHICS 219, 219, 221–22 (2012) (arguing that the lack of consensus about what 
constitutes a fair agreement makes the fair benefits framework impractical; whereas the responsiveness 
requirement gives guidance as to the content of an agreement that is non-exploitative); Udo Schüklenk, 
Calling it a Day on Proceduralism in Bioethics?, 40 HASTINGS CTR. REP. ii (2010) (noting that one of the 
leading experts who initially helped create the fair benefits framework had changed his mind, and also 
agreeing that this framework is likely to result in a “race to the bottom” that produces unfair results). 
 48. Ballantyne, supra note 47 (summarizing critics’ conclusions that the Fair Benefits framework 
should be rejected).  
 49. See Participants 2004 supra note 24, at 19–20. 
 50. See id. at 20, 22 (explaining that a fair level of benefits should be proportional to the amount of 
risks and burdens).  
 51. See James V. Lavery et al., ‘Relief of Oppression: An Organizing Principle for Researchers’ 
Obligations to Participants in Observational Studies in the Developing World, 10 BMC PUB. HEALTH 
1,2,4,6 (June 30, 2010) (advocating ‘relief of oppression’ as an organizing principle to help researchers 
address background conditions of injustice affecting their research participants); see also London, supra 
note 47, at 24, 45 (arguing that the ethics of international research has not adequately addressed 
background social justice); see also Lie, supra note 47, at 3 (noting that the fair benefits approach ignores 
background conditions of injustice). 
 52. See Lie, supra note 47, at 3 (unjust treatment by their own authorities and international 
institutions often contribute to the poverty and deprivation of host country communities); see also London, 
supra note 47, at 24, 25, 30 (explaining that the lower-income countries are more susceptible to illnesses, 
abuse and exploitation due to poverty and social deprivation, that was created in part by Western 
democratic nations who recognize the “international resource privilege.”); see also London & Zollman, 
supra note 47, at 35 (pointing out that populations in low-income countries bear high burdens of 
communicable and preventable disease due to inadequate public health systems). 
2017] FAIR BENEFITS AND ITS CRITICS 7 
from it by being able to conduct trials faster and cheaper than would have been 
possible absent the unjust circumstances.53  
It is further argued that this history generates an obligation on individuals 
from higher-income countries to provide benefits to individuals in lower-income 
countries as a way of compensating them for prior injustice.54 When sponsors 
and investigators from higher-income countries conduct trials in lower-income 
countries, it is not sufficient, as the Fair Benefits framework supposes, to 
compensate the participants and the host communities for the risks and burdens 
they face and the extent to which others benefit from their contributions.55 
Sponsors and investigators also need to discharge their obligations to address the 
conditions of background injustice.56 Rather than benefitting from the (unjustly) 
impoverished circumstances of host communities, sponsors and investigators 
have an obligation to help to remediate those circumstances.57 
The history of injustice in international relations and the impoverished 
circumstances of individuals and communities represent some of the most 
pressing ethical concerns of our time. At the same time, it is unclear how these 
considerations represent an objection to the Fair Benefits framework. As noted, 
the Fair Benefits framework is intended to ensure a fair distribution of the 
benefits and burdens of individual trials. It does not claim that the provision of 
fair benefits in this sense satisfies all the obligations that sponsors and 
researchers might have to participants and host communities in lower-income 
countries. To make this a compelling criticism, advocates would need to show 
how the general obligations to address conditions of injustice in the world are 
relevant to an ethical analysis of individual trials.58  
The challenge here is that attempting to address existing background 
injustice one trial at a time seems, at best, odd and inefficient.59 To illustrate this 
 
 53. See London, supra note 47, at 24 (explaining that lower-income countries are more susceptible 
to exploitation because they have greater health needs, poverty and social deprivation); see also London 
& Zollman, supra note 47, at 35 (noting that sponsor nations might further impose risks and burdens on 
low-income nations for research that will only be relevant and valuable to the sponsor nations). 
 54. See London, supra note 47, at 26. 
 55. See id. at 26, 28 (arguing that making the benefits proportional to the burdens imposed assumes 
that the host country does not have an entitlement to claim a higher baseline than the current status quo; 
London contends this acceptance of the status quo as a normative baseline in host countries is a critical 
issue with the fair benefits framework). 
 56. See Lavery et al., supra note 51, at 4 (advocating a framework called “relief of oppression” that 
aims to encourage researchers to recognize an obligation to address background conditions of injustice). 
 57. See London, supra note 47, at 24, 33–34 (highlighting the “10/90 gap”—namely, that the burdens 
of research participation are generally borne by lower-income nations while the benefits of successful 
research generally go to the top ten percent of the world’s population). 
 58. See Participants 2004, supra note 24, at 19–20 (explaining that exploitation is a micro-level 
concern regarding discrete interactions, rather than about macro-level background social justice issues, 
and that the key issue is the obligation for a fair level of benefits between participants to the interaction). 
 59. See Jennifer S. Hawkins & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Introduction: Why Exploitation? Exploitation 
and Developing Countries, 1, 10–11 (explaining that the implementation of a particular intervention is 
complex and not under the control of a single sponsor). 
8 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 20:001 
concern, imagine a sponsor proposes to conduct research on a life-saving drug in 
two lower-income countries and agrees to fulfill the reasonable availability 
requirement by making the drug free to everyone who could not afford it in those 
two countries. In contrast, the sponsor does not offer to make the drug available 
in any other lower-income countries.60 This proposal satisfies the reasonable 
availability requirement, but it fails to address concerns regarding the 
impoverishment of other countries.61 Put generally, if individuals from higher-
income countries have positive obligations to help those in lower-income 
countries, they presumably have these obligations to all the individuals who live 
in impoverished circumstances, not simply to those who happen to live in the 
communities and countries where the sponsors and investigators conduct their 
studies.62 
It is also not clear why these general obligations would need to be 
discharged through capacity building and/or provision of the interventions 
developed in a clinical trial.63 Couldn’t the investigators and institutions 
discharge their general obligations to address existing injustice by contributing 
to charities that work in lower-income countries and then design their clinical 
trials to ensure that they offer fair benefits? This approach has the advantage of 
satisfying investigators’ and institutions’ general obligations independent of the 
research setting and thereby allowing the ethical evaluation of individual studies 
to focus on the research-specific obligations that are generated through clinical 
trials with participants and communities.64 
We will not attempt to develop an account for how the general obligations 
we all have to rectify background injustice translate into specific obligations on 
researchers and sponsors. But, it seems plausible that one could develop a 
supplementary account of the obligations of researchers and sponsors to remedy 
background injustice based on duties of global beneficence and/or commitments 
made by institutions or individuals.65 This analysis would then constitute an 
effective criticism only if it turns out that the Fair Benefits framework is 
inconsistent in some way with sponsors and investigators satisfying these other 
duties.66 We can think of no reason why satisfying trial specific obligations based 
on the Fair Benefits framework might conflict with investigators and sponsors 
 
 60. Rahul Nayak & Seema K. Shah, Should Social Value Obligations be Local or Global? 31 
BIOETHICS 116, 116 (2017). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Emanuel, supra note 30, at 726 (arguing that the Fair Benefits framework requires a broader 
based assessment of benefits). 
 64. See id. at 726. (arguing that the needs of the community should be considered when assessing 
which benefits would be fair). 
 65. Nayak & Shah, supra note 60, at 124–125; Lavery et al., supra note 51, at 4. 
 66. See generally id. (arguing that the conduct of clinical trials obligates researchers to provide fair 
benefits, but not to relieve oppression, which is a supplemental obligation). 
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also satisfying their general or promissory obligations.67 To us at least, these 
approaches seem complementary, not inconsistent. 
A similar line of reasoning applies to sponsors who benefit from the 
impoverished circumstances of host communities (e.g. by saving on the costs of 
conducting trials).68 A wide range of individuals in higher-income countries 
benefit from the impoverished circumstances of individuals in lower-income 
countries, from tourists who save money on hotels to consumers who save money 
on clothing.69 What is needed, then, is an analysis of the extent to which realizing 
such benefits creates an obligation to help individuals in lower-income countries, 
even when those who benefit are not responsible for the unjust circumstances 
which account for the savings.70 Given the absence of such an account, it is 
difficult to be certain to what extent there are such obligations. However, here 
too we do not see any reason to think that satisfying trial-specific obligations 
based on the Fair Benefits framework might conflict with investigators and 
sponsors also satisfying whatever obligations they might have in this regard.71 
We conclude that concerns regarding background injustice are important, but 
distinct from the concerns addressed by the Fair Benefits framework. Hence, they 
constitute a criticism only in the sense of highlighting the fact that the Fair 
Benefits framework on its own does not enable sponsors and investigators to 
discharge all of their ethical obligations to individuals in lower-income countries. 
B. Does Not Require Best Use of Resources  
The Fair Benefits framework does not mandate that studies in lower-income 
countries must be designed to use resources in the way that offers the greatest 
benefits for host communities.72 While this has been proposed as a criticism of 
the Fair Benefits framework, it is not clear that there is any conflict between these 
two approaches.73 Specifically, if this is an appropriate requirement for clinical 
trials, lower-income countries and communities could charge ethics committees 
(or other oversight bodies) with ensuring that any trials conducted in their 
jurisdiction offer the best use of available resources.74 The clinical trials that 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Angela Ballantyne, HIV International Clinical Research: Exploitation and Risk, 19 BIOETHICS 
476, 484–86 (2005) (explaining that it is cheaper to conduct trials in developing rather than developed 
countries). 
 69. Robert Schrader, What Third World Travel Has Taught Me, HUFFINGTONPOST (Apr. 24, 2012, 
7:27 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-schrader/what-third-world-travel-h_b_1446745.html. 
 70. London, supra note 47, at 24, 33–34. 
 71. Emanuel, supra note 30, at 726.  
 72. Lie, supra note 47 (utilizing an example of the Thai Havrix case, where the research contributed 
to the local health infrastructure despite the drug not being particularly useful for the native population). 
 73. Id. (stating that critics have argued that the use of research resources to study conditions which 
pose a high disease burden in the host country could most benefit the host nation). 
 74. S.R. Benatar, Reflections and Recommendations on Research Ethics in Developing Countries, 54 
SOC. SCI. & MED. 1131, 1137–38 (2002) (discussing research ethics committees, which already work to 
monitor and audit research, and provide accountability in lower-income countries).  
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satisfy these requirements would then be subject to the Fair Benefits framework, 
suggesting that this issue too represents a possible supplement to, rather than a 
criticism of the Fair Benefits framework.75 
C. Does Not Require Health or Study Related Benefits 
Some commentators have criticized the Fair Benefits framework because it 
does not mandate that the benefits provided to participants and host communities 
should be related to the study, or to health more generally.76 This argument is 
difficult to assess because the critics typically do not explain why the benefits 
provided to participants and host communities should be subject to these 
limitations. One possibility would be to appeal to what is often referred to as a 
‘separate spheres’ argument.77 Applied to the present context, the claim would 
be that the benefits offered as part of an activity should be limited to those that 
define the purpose of the activity.78 Since clinical trials are intended to identify 
interventions to improve health, the benefits that individuals in lower-income 
countries receive as a result of participating in these trials should likewise be 
health-related.79 
Even if one endorses this view, provision of interventions that are found to 
be effective is not the only way to provide health benefits to a community.80 
Staffing a medical clinic can provide important health benefits, as can access to 
potable water.81 Thus, even if one agrees that the benefits provided to ensure a 
fair trial must be health-related, it does not follow that they must be limited to 
the interventions that the trials identify as safe and effective.82 
Proponents of the reasonable availability requirement might respond that 
benefits should be study-related, thereby prohibiting provision of potable water 
or staffing of a health clinic.83 Yet, it is even less clear why this might be the 
case.84 Clinic nurses are crucial to conducting clinical trials and they should be 
 
 75. Id.  
 76. See London & Zollman, supra note 47, at 35 (arguing that due to differences in income between 
nations the research conducted may not be focused on the relevant health priorities of low-income 
countries). 
 77. Anat Rosenberg, Separate Spheres Revisited: On the Frameworks of Interdisciplinary and 
Constructions of the Market, 24 L. & LITERATURE 393, 396 (2012) (explaining that the idea of separate 
spheres involves taking a compartmentalized view of the world). 
 78. See generally id. (arguing separate spheres create identifiable areas with distinct logics). 
 79. Emanuel, supra note 30, at 726.  
 80. Ballantyne, supra note 68, at 487–88 (highlighting other health benefits like the improvements 
in the general health care facilities during the research). 
 81. Ballantyne, supra note 68, at 487–88 (discussing investing in health infrastructure).   
 82. Id. at 487–88. 
 83. Participants 2004, supra note 24, at 18. 
 84. Ballantyne, supra note 68, at 487–88 (discussing other benefits available to research in lower-
income countries, such as education and counseling about the disease in question). 
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reimbursed for their efforts.85 At the same time, no one thinks that clinic nurses 
must receive study- related benefits. Nurses typically are happy to be paid a fair 
wage.86 In the same way, no one argues that those who work in factories to 
manufacture sneakers must be compensated with sneakers.87 Are there any 
reasons to think that what is required to ensure a fair deal for research participants 
is fundamentally different?  
Critics might be assuming that clinical trials should be understood in terms 
of providing treatment and research participants should be understood as patients 
who are being treated.88 Certainly it would be unusual to pay patients for their 
participation in the health care system.89 And it would be odd to offer to build 
them a school. Yet, research participants are not patients, and how we should 
treat research participants does not depend on what constitutes appropriate 
treatment of patients.90 We conclude that this criticism is mistaken. 
D. Defines Fairness Procedurally Results In a Race To the Bottom 
Perhaps the most influential criticism maintains that the Fair Benefits 
framework defines what constitutes a fair deal or transaction in a procedural 
way.91 As one commentator argues, “Fair benefits reduces the ethics of 
international health research to a market like transaction, whereby what is fair is 
what is negotiated between international pharmaceutical multinationals and their 
frequently impoverished, under educated, local prospective trial participants.”92 
This presumed reliance on a procedural account of fairness seems to suggest that 
the Fair Benefits framework may lead to market style bargaining between 
sponsors and host communities, resulting in a “race to the bottom.”93 Under the 
 
 85. See Constance Engelking, Facilitating Clinical Trials: The Expanding Role of the Nurse, 67 
CANCER 1793, 1795 (1991) (noting that nurses are instrumental in clinical research); see also Benjamin 
Sachs, The Exceptional Ethics of the Investigator-Subject Relationship, 35 J. MED. & PHILOS. 64, 69 
(2010) (explaining that nurses, acting as employees in the clinical trials, are offered reimbursement for 
their labor regardless of the intervention being studied).  
 86. Sachs, supra note 85 (explaining nurses are acting within their employer-employee relationship 
in which they earn a fair compensation for their labor). 
 87. Id. at 71 (arguing that just as there is no obligation to give coal miners coal to take home, there 
should also be no ethical obligation to provide participants with the investigational therapy tested in their 
trail after the study is over). 
 88. Id. at 76 (noting that there is a difference between an investigator-subject relationship where the 
subject is providing a treatment as opposed to a clinician-patient relationship where the patient is being 
treated).  
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. (discussing the ethical differences between an investigator-subject relationship and a 
clinician-patient relationship).  
 91. Ballantyne, supra note 47, at 241–42 (focusing on problems with relying on a procedural notion 
of fairness). 
 92. Schüklenk, supra note 7, at 2. 
 93. See London & Zollman, supra note 47, at 41 (“[E]ven some fairly restrictive and unrealistic 
requirements aimed at equalizing the bargaining power of researchers and host communities would be 
unlikely to prevent a race to the bottom.”). 
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Fair Benefits framework, sponsors could propose a given study to a number of 
communities, and select the community that agrees to accept the lowest level of 
benefits.94 Given that some benefits are better than no benefits, and many of these 
communities may be in very desperate circumstances, it seems possible, perhaps 
even likely, that this process will lead to provision of a minimal level of benefits 
to whichever community wins the “Fair” benefits auction with the lowest bid.95 
Is this an accurate characterization of how supporters propose to implement the 
Fair Benefits framework? 
The first paper to describe the Fair Benefits framework stated that the host 
community must “determine” what constitutes a fair level of benefits.96 
Advocates of the present criticism read this statement as maintaining that the 
community determines what constitutes a fair level of benefits in the sense that 
whatever level of benefits the community happens to agree to is, according to the 
Fair Benefits framework, necessarily fair.97 As noted by the critics, this is 
problematic because host communities may not realize what constitutes a fair 
deal or they may not have sufficient power to insist on a fair deal.98 As a result, 
host communities may end up agreeing to what in fact is not a fair deal, but which 
is defined as fair by the Fair Benefits framework.99 
This is certainly one way to read the claim that the community ‘determines’ 
what constitutes a fair deal.100 And since the passage in which this sentence is 
embedded does not clarify it, the immediate text provides no reason to think that 
this reading is mistaken.101 At the same time, there is another possible way to 
read this sentence. Consider the claim, made in the context of a criminal trial, 
that the jury determines whether the suspect is guilty. Clearly, this claim does not 
mean: A unanimous guilty verdict makes it the case that the individual is guilty. 
Instead, to claim that the jury ‘determines’ whether the defendant is guilty is to 
claim that the members of the jury use their judgment to assess whether the 
evidence provides sufficient reason to conclude that the individual is guilty, all 
 
 94. See id. at 35 (noting that host communities are more attractive research venues to researchers if 
they are willing to accept a lower share of the surplus value). 
 95. See id. at 41 (noting that if you have two communities that are fairly close to one another, the 
host community that ultimately wins the bid could expect to receive “meager” benefits). 
 96. See Participants 2004, supra note 24, at 23 (explaining how the population that is being asked to 
partake in the collaborative partnership determines whether a particular array of benefits is sufficient and 
fair). 
 97. See Ballantyne, supra note 47 at 241 (explaining that the fair distribution of the benefits of 
research is to be determined on a case-by-case basis by the parties involved in each study). 
 98. See id. (remarking that just because the host community is informed, consents to the research, 
and is involved in the research process does not mean that the deal is fair and that the host community is 
not subject to exploitation).  
 99. See id. (noting that if “fair” is defined as an outcome that the host community is willing to accept, 
it fails to recognize that exploitation may nevertheless exist, especially given “dramatic imbalances of 
power.”). 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. 
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the while recognizing that the evidence may be misleading or the jury’s judgment 
may be faulty.102 This alternative use of ‘determines’ raises the possibility that 
the statement in the original paper might mean that the community determines 
whether an offer is fair in the sense of using their judgment to confirm whether 
it is fair for them.103 
This reading, but not the one endorsed by the critics, is consistent with many 
other aspects of the Fair Benefits framework. It is consistent with the requirement 
in the original paper for transparency and the development of a case law which 
provides examples to help the host community determine, by way of analogy, 
whether a given offer is fair.104 If proponents of the Fair Benefits framework 
assumed that whatever deal the host community accepts is fair, why would they 
add this requirement?105 This alternative reading, but not the critics’ reading, is 
also supported by other passages in the original paper, as well as numerous 
passages in subsequent papers authored by proponents of the Fair Benefits 
framework.106 To consider just two examples, proponents have argued that the 
fact the community is informed and consents “does not ensure that it is protected 
against exploitation. A community may be informed of and consent to a research 
study that is exploitative because the community is desperate and has no other 
options.”107 This statement is clearly inconsistent with the procedural reading. 
Even more clearly, one of the lead authors of the Fair Benefits framework has 
responded to the procedural reading as follows: “The criticisms seem to miss the 
fact that the fairness of agreements is not determined just by bargaining. The 
purpose of the transparency principle is to provide an external check.”108  
If we accept that the Fair Benefits framework does not endorse a procedural 
account of fairness, one might wonder why it mandates that the host community 
must be involved in the discussions to determine what benefits it receives. The 
original paper describing the Fair Benefits framework provided a brief and partial 
answer to this question, stating that the input of the community is critical to 
ensuring that the proposed benefits would be valuable for the community.109 This 
suggestion has been elaborated in a more recent paper, which argues that 
involving host communities in the process of deciding what benefits they receive 
 
 102. Participants 2002 supra note 5, at 2134 (stating that the population participating in a research 
project should decide what constitutes a fair level of benefits similar to how a jury in a criminal matter 
may use evidence to evaluate the culpability of the defendant). 
 103. Id. at 2134. 
 104. See id. (arguing that those outside the research population are ill-equipped to determine if the 
offered benefits are fair); Millum, supra note 47, at 220 (explaining that “the population at risk of 
exploitation must freely decide that the level of benefits offered is sufficient”). 
 105. Ballantyne, supra note 47, at 241. 
 106. Participants 2002, supra note 5, at 2134. 
 107. Segun Gbadegesin & David Wendler, Protecting Communities in Health Research from 
Exploitation, 20 BIOETHICS 248, 249 (2006).  
 108. Emanuel, supra note 30, at 726.  
 109. Participants 2002, supra note 5, at 2134.  
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is crucial, even though the agreement of the community does not make it the case 
that a given offer is fair.110 Instead, involvement of the community promotes four 
important goals: protecting host communities, respecting host communities, 
promoting transparency, and enhancing social value.111 We conclude that the 
original paper alone does not provide definitive reason to reject the present 
criticism. However, taken together, all that has been written regarding the Fair 
Benefits framework by its proponents makes clear that it does not endorse a 
procedural account of fairness. 
E. Lacks Theoretical Account of Fairness/Principle to Determine Which Deals 
Are Fair 
The conclusion that the previous two criticisms are mistaken was based on 
the fact that the Fair Benefits framework does not endorse a procedural account 
of fairness. This conclusion leads naturally to the question: What theory or 
account of fairness does the Fair Benefits framework endorse?112 The extant 
papers describing and supporting the Fair Benefits framework follow 
Wertheimer’s account of exploitation, determining the fairness of individual 
transactions based on the distribution of benefits and burdens that result from the 
transaction.113 On this account, the more one party to a transaction bears the 
burdens and risks, the more it should benefit.114 Similarly, the greater the extent 
to which others benefit from a given party’s contributions to the transaction, the 
more that party should benefit to ensure a fair deal.115 Notice, however, that this 
account does not provide a general theory of fairness.116 It does not, for example, 
offer an analysis of why a particular distribution of benefits and burdens is fair, 
whereas a different distribution would not be fair.117 The Fair Benefits 
framework also does not provide a principle or principles for determining which 
offers are fair in practice.118 Instead, it endorses the principle of transparency in 
 
 110. David Wendler & Seema Shah, Involving Communities in Deciding What Benefits They Receive 
in Multinational Research, 40 J. MED. PHILOS 584 (2015). 
 111. Id. at 584. 
 112. See discussion supra Part III.4 (addressing the criticism that the Fair Benefits framework relies 
on procedural fairness, which relates to a second criticism that research sponsors will choose the 
community which will accept the lowest level of benefits). 
 113. Alan Wertheimer, EXPLOITATION 207–246 (Princeton Univ. Press 1999) (using an example of 
rescuing stranded motorists during a snowstorm to demonstrate how to assess whether transactions are 
exploitative based on the distribution of burdens and benefits). 
 114. See id. at 226–277 (citing several examples in which one party bears the risk and so charges a 
higher fee for services to increase benefits). 
 115. See id. at 227 (using student athletes and the Marxian proletariat as examples of exploited parties 
because their contributions to the transaction are greater than the benefits they receive).   
 116. See id. at 216 (arguing that there is a difference between distributing social resources fairly and 
transacting fairly and that fair transactions account for moral factors, “such as justifying aid or 
redistribution.”). 
 117. Id. at Ch. 7.  
 118. Ballantyne, supra note 47, at 241.  
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the development of a repository of deals that have been endorsed previously and 
against which future offers can be evaluated.119 Some critics have argued that 
this approach provides reason to reject the Fair Benefits framework in favor of 
an alternative approach.120  
The Fair Benefits framework certainly does not offer a definitive theory of 
fairness and the identification of one would be a welcome development for more 
than just the ethics of multinational research.121 The absence of such an account 
increases the possibility that implementation of the Fair Benefits framework will 
result in deals that in fact are not fair.122 Granting this possibility, no one has 
developed a theory of fairness which has received universal endorsement.123 It 
follows that this concern applies to all approaches that attempt to address the 
potential for exploitation in multinational research; hence, it does not provide a 
reason to endorse one approach over another. For example, absent a final theory 
of fairness, one could equally argue that it is unclear whether making proven 
interventions reasonably available in host communities is sufficient to ensure a 
fair trial. 
Finally, it seems implausible to argue that, until a final theory of fairness 
has been identified, no substantive frameworks should be proposed, and no 
attempts should be made to address the potential for exploitation in multinational 
research.124 We conclude that this criticism does indeed point to a shortcoming 
of the Fair Benefits framework, a shortcoming that is shares with all accounts 
that seek to address the potential for exploitation. Absent a final account of 
fairness, then, or some reason to think that the Fair Benefits framework is more 
likely to be inconsistent with such an account than other approaches, this 
criticism does not provide a reason to reject the Fair Benefits framework in favor 
of some other approach, or no approach at all.  
 
 119. Participants 2002, supra note 5, at 2134.  
 120. Millum, supra note 47, at 220. 
 121. Participants 2004, supra note 24, at 23; see Participants 2002, supra note 5, at 2134 (noting that 
the lack of an international standard of fairness may impact a community’s decision-making); see 
Ballantyne, supra note 47, at 244 (“A key limitation of the current debate about whether international 
research is exploitative has been the lack of a suitable concept of ‘fair distribution’…”); see id. 
(emphasizing the need for further development of international standards of fairness). 
 122. See London & Zollman, supra note 47, at 34–35 (arguing that the ambiguities in the Fair Benefits 
approach make implementing the model fairly a difficult, if not impossible, task). 
 123. See Angela J. Ballantyne, How To Do Research Fairly in an Unjust World, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 
26, 28 (2010) (noting that a lack of a “normative account of fair distribution” hinders fair transactions in 
international research).   
 124. See London & Zollman, supra note 47, at 34–35 (criticizing the Fair Benefits approach for its 
lack of a definitive process without proposing an alternative). 
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F. Fails to Specify Procedures 
Critics point out that the Fair Benefits framework does not specify what 
type of process should be used to satisfy its requirements in practice.125 Given 
that the Fair Benefits framework does not offer a theory of fairness, and lacks a 
specific principle for determining which deals are fair, the challenge of 
specifying the process that should be used to implement it is especially 
important.126  
We believe this is the most important challenge for the Fair Benefits 
framework. Future research will be needed to address this challenge and also to 
address a number of substantive questions regarding what a final process should 
look like.127 For example, the conclusion that the Fair Benefits framework does 
not endorse a process account of fairness raises the question of what should be 
done when a host community insists on accepting what seems an insufficient 
level of benefits.128 Respect for the community would suggest that perhaps the 
community should be allowed to accept unfair offers; emphasis on fairness as an 
ethical requirement suggests that these trials should not be approved.129 
A related question concerns whether there should be an appeals process. 
Imagine that a sponsor proposes a package of benefits to a host community. The 
community regards the offer as sufficient, but the ethics review committee find 
it inadequate. Should there be some process for appeal to a different body? 
Alternatively, should the sponsor be allowed to approach other review 
committees and host communities to determine whether they regard the proposed 
offer as fair?  
Describing an appropriate process or processes, and answering these 
substantive questions, represents the greatest challenge for the Fair Benefits 
framework. Yet, absent some reason to think that it will not be possible to 
describe an appropriate and feasible process, this challenge does not suggest that 
another approach is preferable to the Fair Benefits framework. Moreover, the 
argument that ensuring fair benefits requires a significant exercise of judgment 
on the part of ethics committees or those overseeing benefit-sharing 
 
 125. See id. at 34–35 (arguing that important components of the theory have not been “described in 
operationally useful detail.”). 
 126. See Ballantyne, supra note 123 at 28 (noting that little progress has been made in clarifying a 
process for implementation, and describing a lack of specific principles as a “key limitation”). 
 127. See London & Zollman, supra note 47, at 37 (posing questions about what the process should 
look like, including how the bargaining process should be shaped to meet the goals of the fair benefits 
framework, how priorities in the framework should be handled in the process, and how unfair proposals 
that are accepted by host countries should be addressed). 
 128. See Ballantyne, supra note 123, at 27–28 (noting it may be “rational” for host nations to agree to 
transactions that are exploitative because they might represent the “best available option”). 
 129. See Danielle M. Wenner, Against Permitted Exploitation in Developing World Research 
Agreements, BIOETHICS 2, 2–3 (2015) (noting that some scholars feel interfering with these transactions 
would violate the autonomy and self-determination of the local community while others, including the 
author, feel that such interference would lead to better deals for the host country). 
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arrangements does not make fair benefits unworkable in practice.130 There are 
many conditions on ethical research for which we lack a principle to determine 
when they are satisfied and, hence, for which judgment is required. 
To consider just one example, it is widely agreed that research participants 
should provide voluntary consent.131 They should not be coerced or manipulated 
into enrolling in a study.132 In practice, it is extremely difficult to determine 
whether a given decision is voluntary and no principle exists that allows 
investigators to determine whether the decision of a particular individual is in 
fact sufficiently voluntary.133 Yet, no one would argue that we should reject 
voluntary consent as a necessary ethical condition on the grounds that judgment 
is needed to ensure that it is realized in practice.134 This comparison is especially 
apt given evidence to think that our judgment regarding which deals are 
acceptable is likely to be easier with respect to fairness than it is with respect to 
voluntariness.135 In particular, there is compelling evidence that a sense of 
fairness and judgments of whether individual offers are fair or unfair is common 
across most, if not all human beings.136 In contrast, we know of no evidence to 
suggest that individuals have a common sense for when decisions are voluntary. 
We conclude that the present claim represents a criticism of the Fair Benefits 
framework only to the extent of establishing that the framework is not complete 
and there is more work to do. 
 
 130. See Millum, supra note 47, at 221 (arguing that even in developing countries where judgment in 
the oversight process might be compromised due to lack of training pressure from various institutions, or 
insufficient funding, the fair benefits framework could still be modified to accommodate the situation). 
 131. See Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Voluntariness of Consent to Research: A Conceptual Model, 39 
HASTINGS CTR. REP., 30, 30 (2009) (defining voluntary participation as a key component of informed 
consent). 
 132. See id. at 32 (recounting the widely accepted definition of voluntariness adopted in the 
Nuremberg decision that participants “should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, 
without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior 
form of constraint or coercion.”). 
 133. See Amulya Mandava & Joseph Millum, Manipulation in the Enrollment of Research 
Participant, 43 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 38, 38 (2013) (placing the burden on researchers to consider subtle 
factors that might influence participants’ decision to enroll, such as the participants’ respect for the 
physician running the study); see also Appelbaum et al., supra note 131, at 30 (establishing that voluntary 
informed consent is a necessary requirement for ethical research participation). 
 134. See Appelbaum, supra note 131, at 39–40 (exploring the spectrum from legitimate methods of 
influence, which are consistent with participants voluntarily participating, to other methods that disrespect 
the participants’ autonomy and make their involvement involuntary, such as unacceptable manipulation). 
 135. Appelbaum et al., supra note 131, at 45 (examining scenarios where the same behavior in 
different contexts changes whether a participant’s involvement is voluntary or not, underscoring the 
difficulty of recognizing truly voluntary action). 
 136. See Sarah F. Brosnan & Frans B.M. de Waal, Evolution of Responses to (Un)fairness, 346 SCI. 
1251776–1, (2014) (describing how human understanding of fairness revolves around judging how 
appropriate outcomes impact everyone in the community, not just the individual making the judgment); 
see also, Christopher T. Dawes, et al., Egalitarian Motives in Humans, 446 NATURE, 794, 796 (2007) 
(noting that humans are “strongly influenced by egalitarian preferences” that cause people to react 
negatively when faced with a socially unequal situation). 
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G. Responsiveness is More Practical 
As we have seen, the Fair Benefits framework does not provide a theory or 
principle against which specific deals can be evaluated to ensure they are fair. 
This is concerning given that, in many cases, it will be difficult to determine what 
constitutes a fair deal. What offer of benefits would be fair for a phase 1 study 
that enrolls 10 participants and gives them a single dose of a new drug? Given 
this complexity, it has been argued that the combination of the responsiveness 
requirement and reasonable availability is more likely to yield fair deals than 
permitting the provisions of other types of benefits, as the Fair Benefits 
framework allows.137 
This criticism is based on the fact that ethics review committees or 
institutional review boards need to evaluate the risks and burdens of clinical trials 
to ensure that their social value justifies the risks and burdens they pose.138 Given 
that this process is already in place, it may be easier to rely on these judgments 
rather than requiring research ethics committees to make additional judgments 
regarding the value of other types of benefits.139 Not only will the Fair Benefits 
approach require more work but, according to this critique, it requires that review 
committees make judgements regarding questions for which they lack expertise, 
such as the value to a community of building a school or staffing a health 
clinic.140 
As we have noted, many studies turn out to have negative results.141 In these 
cases, reliance on responsiveness and reasonable availability to address the 
potential for exploitation is inadequate. Or it implies that sponsors and 
researchers can discharge their obligations merely by providing the community 
with the information that the study drug is not effective against a condition of 
interest to the community.142 In contrast, reliance on Fair Benefits might result in 
the community receiving a school or a health clinic. In these cases at least, it 
seems that communities are more likely to receive a fair level of benefits under 
the Fair Benefits framework. 
 
 137. See Millum, supra note 47, at 221 (arguing in favor of the responsiveness requirement and 
reasonable availability over the Fair Benefits framework on this basis). 
 138. Nancy King, Larry Churchill, Assessing and Comparing Potential Benefits and Risks of Harm, 
in THE OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL RESEARCH ETHICS 514, 514 (2008) (Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al. 
eds., 2008). 
 139. See Millum, supra note 47, at 220–22 (noting that under the responsiveness requirement, “a 
research project that involved testing an experimental hepatitis A vaccine on rural inhabitants of Tanzania 
if the only benefits that accrued to the local population were that the research team built a clinic and a 
school” would be prohibited). 
 140. Millum, supra note 47, at 221.  
 141. Rafael Dal-Ré et al., Protections for Clinical Trials in Low and Middle Income Countries Need 
Strengthening not Weakening, 349 BRIT. MED. J. 1, 2 (2014). 
 142. London, supra note 18, at 739 (noting that in cases that have negative results, the benefits from 
a study that was responsive to a community’s needs can vary). 
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What about successful trials? Is reliance on responsiveness and reasonable 
availability better in these cases? The present criticism is based on the fact that 
review committees already make risk-benefit evaluations for these trials. It 
follows that reliance on the Fair Benefits framework will result in review 
committees having to make an additional determination. Whether this fact 
suggests that the Fair Benefits approach is less likely to address the potential for 
exploitation depends on more than just the number of determinations that need 
to be made. It depends on the extent to which review committees’ judgement is 
accurate in each case. The fact that research ethics committees are required to 
evaluate the risks and burdens of a given study in comparison to the social value 
of the information to be gained does not imply that committees’ judgements in 
this regard are accurate, nor that these determinations are easier to make than the 
determinations called for by the Fair Benefits framework.143  
Imagine a study evaluating a new approach to developing a malaria vaccine 
in a community where malaria is endemic. To determine the value of the study 
for the community, one needs to evaluate the chances that the general approach 
will be successful, the chances that this success will lead to the development of 
a specific vaccine, that this vaccine will be effective and reasonably safe, and it 
will be provided to the community at a cost its members can afford.144 These are 
extremely complicated judgments, and determining whether a particular study 
offers sufficient value for the community to compensate for the burdens it poses 
is difficult at best. Contrast this with the question of the extent to which the 
community would benefit from access to potable water, or the building and 
staffing of a school. These seem to be easier judgments to make. This suggests 
that, in practice, the Fair Benefits framework may be more likely to result in fair 
deals for participants and host communities compared to the combination of 
responsiveness and reasonable availability. Of course, there will be cases in 
which responsiveness and reasonable availability provide appropriate benefits 
for the host community.145 However, these cases do not pose a problem for the 
Fair Benefits framework given that it endorses responsiveness and it allows the 
requirement for fair benefits to be satisfied by provision of the study drug.146 
 
 143. See King & Churchill, supra note 138, at 524 (noting that balancing the risks of harm and 
potential benefits takes several steps). But see Millum, supra note 47, at 221 (arguing that the 
responsiveness requirement is easy to apply).  
 144. See Millum, supra note 47, at 220 (noting the objection to the responsiveness requirement that 
results in a successful project should ensure that intervention is reasonably available to the host 
community). 
 145. See id. at 221 (exemplifying a case of malaria vaccine where a responsiveness requirement would 
prevent exploitation); Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Addressing Exploitation: Reasonable Availability versus Fair 
Benefits, in THE EXPLOITATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 286, 296 (Jennifer S. Hawkins & Ezekiel J. 
Emanuel eds., 2008) (noting that “reasonable availability” works well in successful Phase III clinical 
research). 
 146. London, supra note 18, at 744 (concluding that the nature of responsiveness encompasses the 
social value which comes from addressing the most significant health needs of the community’s 
members). 
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Finally, the present proposal attempts to leverage the fact that review 
committees already are charged with evaluating whether the potential benefits of 
a study in terms of the information to be gained justify the risks it poses.147 The 
thought then is that this process also provides a way to ensure individuals and 
host communities receive fair benefits. The problem with this suggestion is that 
review committees evaluate whether the potential benefits of a study justify its 
risks. However, the potential for exploitation is not limited to the risks and 
burdens to which individuals in lower-income countries are exposed.148 It also 
includes the extent to which individuals in lower-income countries contribute to 
the benefits that result from the trial.149 This factor is not typically evaluated by 
ethics review committees.150 They do not, for instance, assess to what extent 
participants and host communities contribute to the profits realized by 
commercial sponsors and whether the benefits offered to the participants and 
host communities are commensurate with these contributions.151 We conclude 
that the combination of responsiveness and reasonable availability is unlikely to 
yield fair deals across a broader range of cases than the Fair Benefits 
framework.152 
H. Undermines Responsiveness 
One might assume that requiring reasonable availability of study 
interventions makes sense only to the extent that the study satisfies the 
responsiveness requirement.153 Specifically, the extent to which the host 
community will benefit from the reasonably availability of tested and proven 
intervention depends on the extent to which the testing of that intervention was 
responsive to the host community’s health needs. At the extreme, testing and 
making available an intervention for a condition that is absent in the community 
will provide it with no benefits. This connection between the two requirements 
 
 147. See King & Churchill, supra note 138, at 514.  
 148. See id. (indicating that when evaluating the ethics of a study under Fair Benefits, benefits and 
risks must be considered); see Millum, supra note 47, at 219 (2012) (arguing that one party can exploit 
another even if both benefit from their interaction). 
 149. James V. Lavery, Obligation to Ensure Access to Beneficial Treatments for Research 
Participants at the Conclusion of Clinical Trials, in THE OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 
ETHICS 697, 701 (Ezekiel J. Emanuel ET AL. eds., 2008) (indicating that there are ethical issues regarding 
the obligation to recognize the contribution of research participants, particularly in low- and middle-
income countries). 
 150. See Millum, supra note 47 (suggesting that under the responsiveness approach, ethics review 
committees do not need to spend time talking with representatives of communities, examining data, and 
comparing proposed benefit arrangements with arrangements elsewhere). 
 151. See Millum, supra note 47, at 219 (criticizing foreign scientists who hide the true prospects for 
commercialization from a community that has little contact with the modern world when obtaining 
knowledge of a native plant’s healing properties). 
 152. Participants 2004, supra note 24 (proposing that a “fair benefits” framework offers a more 
reliable and justifiable method to prevent exploitation). 
 153. See Millum, supra note 47, at 220 (noting that the responsiveness requirement should include a 
provision that ensures the intervention is made “reasonably available” to populations after the trial).  
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raises the question of whether it makes sense for the Fair Benefits framework to 
endorse responsiveness as a necessary requirement for ethical multinational 
research, but then offer an alternative to the reasonable availability requirement. 
Why, in other words, require responsiveness without mandating reasonable 
availability? If sponsors do not have to make tested interventions reasonably 
available to the host communities, why think that the interventions they test in 
lower-income countries must be relevant to the health needs of those 
communities? 
To answer this question, more research will be needed on whether 
responsiveness is an independent ethical requirement on research in lower-
income countries. As noted previously, the responsiveness and reasonable 
availability requirements can be understood as addressing different ethical 
concerns.154 Responsiveness provides a justification for why a trial is conducted 
in a particular place and addresses concerns regarding fair subject selection, 
while reasonable availability attempts to ensure that the risk-benefit profile of 
the study is ethically appropriate when conducted in that place.155 
Put in these terms, the present challenge is the following: Does a study that 
is not subject to the reasonable availability requirement need to be responsive to 
the heath needs of the local community in order to ensure that is satisfies the 
requirement for fair subject selection? The answer depends on whether studies 
that are not responsive, but which nonetheless provide participants and host 
communities with sufficient benefits, are ethical.156 However, the answer to this 
question does not seem clear, at least to us. It is not clear that unresponsive 
studies exploit participants who receive a fair share of the benefits. This suggests 
that enrolling specific individuals or targeting a specific community might be 
justified on the grounds that they will benefit from their participation in the trial. 
In these cases, the responsiveness requirement is not needed to address the 
potential exploitation. Whether it is needed at all then depends on whether there 
is other normative work for it to do in these cases.  
One possibility would be to argue that requiring responsiveness in addition 
to fair benefits provides a way to maximize the use of scarce resources. If there 
are several studies competing for a limited number of sites or participants, it 
might make sense for lower-income countries to prioritize the studies that offer 
the greatest value for the community or the country. This goal might be realized 
by focusing on studies that are responsive to the community’s health priorities.157  
This analysis suggests that the present argument would offer a challenge to 
the Fair Benefits framework if responsiveness is an independent ethical 
 
 154. See infra text accompanying note 47; see infra text accompanying note 157 
 155. See Millum, supra note 47, at 220 (explaining that a responsiveness requirement means that 
research is justified only if it is responsive to the health needs or priorities of the host community). 
 156. Lavery, supra note 149, at 697, 699. 
 157. Seema K. Shah, Rebecca Wolitz, & Ezekiel Emanuel, Refocusing the responsiveness 
Requirement. 27 BIOETHICS 151, at 158 (2013).  
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requirement on research in lower-income countries and it must be combined with 
reasonable availability to address the potential for exploitation. We have argued 
that this is not the case; a requirement for fair benefits addresses the potential for 
exploitation better than a requirement for reasonable availability. Alternatively, 
it might turn out that the provision of fair benefits is sufficient to ensure ethical 
trials, in which case responsiveness is not ethically necessary. This conclusion 
would not provide a reason to reject the Fair Benefits framework. Instead, it 
would provide a reason to endorse a revised version, one which continues to 
insist on the provision of a fair level of benefits but which dispenses with the 
requirement for responsiveness. We leave for future analysis the question of 
whether this revised version represents a better Fair Benefits framework. 
IV. SUMMARY  
It is widely agreed that research conducted in lower-income countries by 
investigators and sponsors from higher-income countries should not exploit 
participants and host communities.158 Most commentators also agree that, in 
order to address the potential for exploitation, participants and host communities 
should receive adequate benefits.159 Debate now focuses on how the requirement 
for adequate benefits should be realized in practice.160 For this purpose, the Fair 
Benefits framework was proposed as an alternative to the reasonable availability 
requirement. It is intended to ensure an appropriate distribution of the risks and 
benefits that result from a given trial.161 To realize this goal, the framework 
specifies that the host community and participants should be provided with a fair 
level of benefits, given the risks and burdens they face, and the extent to which 
others benefit from their contributions to the trial.162  
The preceding discussion has evaluated what we take to be the 8 most 
prominent criticisms of this proposal. This analysis suggests that the prominent 
criticisms can be placed in three categories. First, a number of the criticisms are 
in fact not criticisms of the Fair Benefits framework itself, but concern related 
issues. These issues are important, but they do not provide a reason to reject fair 
benefits. For example, some have argued that the Fair Benefits framework does 
not require that individual trials are approved only when they represent the best 
 
 158. Participants 2004, supra note 24, at 17–18 (noting Fair Benefits Framework has been developed 
in an effort to prevent exploitation of research participants). 
 159. Id. at 22.  
 160. Id. at 18 (describing how some commentators argue that unless a host community receives the 
fruits of clinical research, the trial is exploitative). 
 161. Id. at 22.  
 162. Participants 2002, supra note 5, at 2133–34 (explaining that under the Fair Benefits framework, 
research must address a health concern of the tested population, research objectives must justify testing in 
that population, and research must pose a favorable risk/benefit ratio). 
2017] FAIR BENEFITS AND ITS CRITICS 23 
use of resources for host communities.163 This might be an important 
requirement; however, it also seems like an independent one. Even when a trial 
represents the best possible use of the available resources of a given community, 
it will still be important to ensure that the trial does not exploit host communities; 
the Fair Benefits framework is intended for this purpose.164 
Second, we have argued that a number of the criticisms of the Fair Benefits 
framework are mistaken. This is true of one of the most prominent criticisms of 
the Fair Benefits framework—the claim that it assumes a procedural account of 
fairness and, in practice, would lead to a race to the bottom. A few isolated 
statements in the original paper endorsing the Fair Benefits framework are 
consistent with this view.165 However, a reading that takes into account the 
entirety of the original paper and the subsequent papers authored by its 
proponents makes clear that this reading is mistaken.  
Third, some criticisms are accurate, such as the criticism that the Fair 
Benefits framework does not provide a definitive theory of fairness.166 While it 
would be preferable to have such a theory, this criticism does not provide a 
reason to reject the Fair Benefits framework. The absence of a definitive theory 
is a concern for any proposal to address the potential for exploitation in 
multinational research. However, we do not think that this fact provides a reason 
to abandon the attempt to do the best we can to ensure fairness for research 
participants and host communities in lower-income countries. Many of the 
widely-accepted requirements on ethical research lack the support of a complete 
theory.167 The example we considered in this regard is the requirement that 
informed consent must be voluntary.168 
The present analysis suggests that the most important criticism points out 
that the Fair Benefits framework does not provide a complete description of the 
procedures that should be used to implement it in practice.169 This criticism 
highlights the need for future research to describe and refine the Fair Benefits 
 
 163. Lie, supra note 47, at 3 (describing the Thai Havrix case, where the research was the most prudent 
use of in-country resources to build research capacity, despite the drug not being particularly useful for 
the native population).  
 164. Participants 2002, supra note 5, at 2133–34 (describing how the Fair Benefits Framework avoids 
exploitation of the host community). 
 165. Lie, supra note 47, at 3. 
 166. Participants 2002, supra note 5, at 2133–34 (explaining that the Fair Benefits framework still 
lacks total agreement within the research community and that there is no consensus on a theory of 
fairness). 
 167. Ballantyne, supra note 47, at 244 (noting there is not one standard for what constitutes a fair 
distribution of benefits). 
 168. Mandava & Millum, supra note 133, at 38–47, 44 (discussing how disclosure, understanding, 
and voluntariness can affect consent to such a degree that it is invalidated). 
 169. See London & Zollman, supra note 47, at 34–35 (arguing the Fair Benefits Framework suffers 
from fundamental ambiguities at a “conceptual and operational level.”). 
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framework to make clear exactly what procedures would best implement it.170 
While this is an important challenge, we believe that it can   be addressed.  
Finally, we pointed out that provision of fair benefits to host communities 
raises the question of whether research must also be responsive to their health 
needs.171 While this is an important question, it is more a challenge for 
proponents of the responsiveness requirement. Why should we think that a study 
needs to be responsive in addition to providing a fair level of benefits? Is 
responsiveness nonetheless needed to satisfy the requirement for fair subject 
selection? A finding that there is a reason to require responsiveness in addition 
to fair benefits would validate the Framework’s original endorsement of this 
requirement. A finding that the provision of fair benefits is sufficient, and 
responsiveness is not ethically necessary, would provide a reason to endorse a 
revised version of the framework, one which continues to insist on the provision 
of a fair level of benefits but which dispenses with the requirement for 
responsiveness. 
In sum, the present analysis suggests that the extant criticisms provide no 
reason to reject the Fair Benefits framework. We conclude that the Fair Benefits 
framework represents the best approach for addressing the potential exploitation 
of research participants and host communities in lower-income countries. 
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Criticism Comments Assessment 
Ignores background 
injustice 
FBs addresses trial  
specific duties  Distinct Issue  
Does not require best 
use resources 
FBs determines which trials fair, 
not which trials best  Distinct Issue 
Benefits should be 
study/health related 
Fairness is about the level,  
not type, of benefits False  
Defines fairness 
procedurally 
Inconsistent with transparency 
requirement  
and many statements 
False 
Lacks a theory or 
principle of fairness 
Challenge for any attempt  
to address exploitation True  
Lacks details on 
procedures 
Not a reason to reject FBs; need 
further research True 
Responsiveness more 
practical Untrue in many cases Likely False 
Undermines 
responsiveness 
Challenge for responsiveness, not 
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